Early-transition output decline revisited by Polanec, Saso & Kostevc, Crt
  
 
Early-transition Output Decline Revisited 
 
Sašo Polanec and Črt Kostevc 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this paper we revisit the issue of aggregate output decline that took place in the early transition 
period. We propose an alternative explanation of output decline that is applicable to Central- and 
Eastern-European countries. In the first part of the paper we develop a simple dynamic general 
equilibrium model that builds on work by Gomulka and Lane (2001). In particular, we consider 
price liberalization, interpreted as elimination of distortionary taxation, as a trigger of the output 
decline. We show that price liberalization in interaction with heterogeneous adjustment costs and 
non-employment benefits lead to aggregate output decline and surge in wage inequality. While 
these patterns are consistent with actual dynamics in CEE countries, this model cannot generate 
output decline in all sectors. Instead sectors that were initially taxed even exhibit output growth. 
Thus, in the second part we consider an alternative general equilibrium model with only one 
production sector and two types of labor and distortion in a form of wage compression during the 
socialist era. The trigger for labor mobility and consequently output decline is wage 
liberalization. Assuming heterogeneity of workers in terms of adjustment costs and 
non-employment benefits can explain output decline in all industries.  
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 1  Introduction 
 
It is a well established stylized fact that all Central- and Eastern-European countries (CEE) and 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) experienced a large aggregate output decline soon 
after they initiated the process of economic reforms. The decline resulted in an extensive 
theoretical and empirical research, which tried to understand its causes and economic 
mechanisms. Theoretical explanations of output decline can be divided into two strands of 
literature. According to the first one, the decline was caused by stabilization policies, which 
caused excessive inward shift of aggregate demand (e.g. Berg and Blanchard, 1994; Rosati, 
1994). The second strand of the literature, recently receiving more attention, focuses on the 
factors underlying the inward shifts of aggregate supply. Calvo and Coricelli (1993) related the 
output decline to a reduction in available credit for financing production. Blanchard and Kremer 
(1997) built a model in which price liberalization triggers a process of bargaining between firms 
in vertical supply chains, which may, under incomplete contracts or asymmetric information, lead 
to an output decline.
1
 Roland and Verdier (1999) propose a search model that relates price 
liberalization, interpreted as a freedom to contract, to output decline. The fall of output takes 
place because firms are willing to postpone their relational investment in a situation where the 
option of ongoing search is more valuable than immediate investment. Blanchard and Kremer 
(1997) recognized that their explanation was more relevant for CIS countries, which also applies 
to the model of Roland and Verdier (1999). For more liberal CEE countries that did not face such 
bargaining inefficiencies and information asymmetries, we still do not have a convincing 
explanation why price liberalization may have caused aggregate output decline. 
 
In this paper we propose an alternative explanation of the output decline in CEE countries that 
partly builds on the work of Gomulka and Lane (2001). Starting with a simple two-period 
two-sector general equilibrium model, we first consider the effect of price liberalization, 
interpreted as elimination of distortionary taxation, on sectoral and aggregate dynamics of both 
output and employment. The elimination of price distortions increases the price of initially 
subsidized good and decreases the price of initially taxed good. This creates incentives for 
relocation of workers from the subsidized sector to taxed sector. However, workers are assumed 
to differ in terms of adjustment or mobility costs and non-employment benefits provided by the 
government and supplemented by income generated by working in informal economy. 
Specifically, both mobility costs and non-employment benefits increase with age of workers. 
These costs and benefits work as a sorting mechanism, creating incentives for younger workers to 
move to the sector with increasing prices and incentives to move to inactivity by older workers. 
The aggregate number of hours worked declines due to hours lost in mobility and hours lost due 
to inactivity of workers. While the output of sector with increasing price expands, this increase is 
smaller than a decline in the sector with declining price, causing aggregate output decline 
evaluated at initial relative prices. At the same time the adjustment costs create a wedge between 
the wages prevalent in the two sectors, thereby increasing the wage inequality. 
 
This model has several attractive features that are not present in the model developed by 
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 Konings and Walsh (1999) used data for a sample of Ukrainian firms and showed that firms with more complex 
production structures indeed grew more slowly in terms of employment, which supports the theory developed by 
Blanchard and Kremer (1997). 
Gomulka and Lane (2001). In particular, they assume prohibitive adjustment costs to labour 
mobility and predetermined real wages. These two assumptions imply that expanding sectors 
cannot employ additional workers and thus cannot increase output, while real wage rigidity 
causes a decline in sectors with increasing price. While their model can explain aggregate output 
decline, it is inconsistent with several stylized facts regarding the functioning of labour markets 
that our model takes into account. In particular, their model does not feature a large proportion of 
voluntary shifts of workers from employment to inactivity due to high non-employment benefits 
(see Boeri, 2000a; Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Vodopivec, Wörgötter and Raju, 2003)
2
 and 
participation in an informal economy (Johnson, Kaufmann and Shleifer, 1997; Lacko, 2000), and 
completely ignores an increase in wage inequality during the period of output decline (Milanovic, 
2002). The real wage rigidity assumed by Gomulka and Lane (2001) implies that labour outflows 
should be involuntary and inequality should not change. Our model also provides a more 
convincing explanation for the duration of output decline as we rely on non-employment benefits 
and income generated in informal economy, rather than on sustained wage rigidity in the 
economy with high unemployment and no government benefits. In our view, voluntary flows of 
workers to inactivity and persistence of the real wage rigidity had the same cause. The combined 
benefits put an effective lower bound on the real wages in declining sector and provided an 
attractive alternative to work in the official economy. 
 
In spite of its attractive features, the two-sector model with price liberalization is not able to 
explain output decline that took place in virtually entire economy (see Roland, 2000). In the 
second part we show that wage liberalization, interpreted as elimination of cross-subsidization of 
less productive workers, could explain output decline in all industries as long as workers are 
different in human capital if we preserve similar heterogeneity of workers in terms of adjustment 
costs and non-employment benefits. However, given scarce microeconomic evidence, we cannot 
argue that the proposed mechanism dominates the effects of trade embargoes and aggregate 
demand shifts.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized in three sections. In the second section we present a 
model of price liberalization, the third section discusses the effects of wage liberalization. The 
last section concludes. 
 
2  A model of price liberalization 
 
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model that allows us to analyze the effects of 
price liberalization on both sectoral and aggregate employment and output. Following the work 
of Gomulka and Lane (2001), we focus on a specific mechanism that works through changes in 
relative prices and thus leave aside bargaining inefficiencies and search frictions that could have 
arisen after price liberalization. 
 
In our model price liberalization is considered as elimination of distortionary taxes on firms' 
revenues. In reality, however, socialist governments used a wide variety of measures that 
distorted both prices and allocations. On one hand, they interfered with decisions on employment, 
investments and new research activities, and on the other hand, they pursued desired allocations 
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 Even for Russia, where employment reductions were particularly modest, Earle and Sabirianova (2001) find that 
75 percent of all separations were voluntary. 
through direct setting of prices, wages and interest rates (Kornai, 1994). Since allocations, prices 
of production factors and prices of final goods were mostly inconsistent with the market 
determined ones, governments supported these allocations through extensive redistribution 
systems, which combined different types of taxes and subsidies ranging from direct taxation to 
inflationary taxation.
3
 Nevertheless, by focusing merely on one type of government intervention 
-- distortionary taxation -- and its elimination, no substantive insight is lost. In fact, in the 
framework with linear production technologies and exogenously given number of products that 
we consider below, distortionary tax system alone can generate any desired allocation of labour. 
Therefore, in what follows, we consider introduction and removal of only this type of 
government intervention.
4
 
 
2.1  Setup 
 
2.1.1  Firms 
 
We assume that firms produce two distinct goods, x  and y , according to the same Ricardian 
production function, which require one unit of labor to produce one unit of final good:  
 
 ,,=,= yxjlq jj  (1) 
 
where jq  and jl  denote sector j 's output and employment, respectively. Since we are 
interested in a relatively short period of output decline that in CEE countries typically lasted two 
to three years, we assume away accumulation of physical capital and technological progress. In 
addition, firms face no entry and exit costs, which combined with constant returns to scale 
production function leaves market structure indeterminate. These assumptions greatly simplify 
the modeling framework, ensure tractability, and allow us to reduce the value maximization 
problem of firms into a standard profit maximization problem. 
 
The profit of the representative firm producing good j  is:  
 
 ,)(1= jjjjjj lwqp   (2) 
 
where jp  and jw  denote the price of good j  and the wage rate paid for unit of labour in 
production of j , respectively. j  denotes the proportionate tax (or subsidy) rate levied on 
sales. Note that the choice of sales tax is not very restrictive as the same equilibrium allocations 
could be achieved by introducing sector specific taxation of gross wages. Namely, linear 
production functions imply that it is irrelevant what type of tax is used in order to distort 
allocation of labour between sectors, which can be observed from the first order conditions for 
profit maximization:  
                                                     
3
 Note that disinflationary policies could have the same effect as price liberalization as subsidies through inflationary 
monetary policy had to be reduced. 
4
 Distortionary taxation and direct measures of resource allocation may give very different results in the context of 
new products and services. A ban on entry of private firms may effectively limit the extent of product variety, which 
could be achieved only by prohibitively high taxation on firm entry. 
  .=)(1 jjj wp  (3) 
 
 
Since net wages were equal between sectors, differences in taxation of wages were reflected in 
labor costs and consequently in differences in prices. 
 
2.1.2  Households 
 
The economy is populated by a continuum of one worker/consumer households indexed on an 
interval between 0 and 1. Their utility function is defined over a consumption bundle of two 
goods and leisure time. The utility function for household i  is: 
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The first part of (4) is a standard CES subutility function defined over quantities of goods x  and 
y  consumed with an elasticity of substitution,  , that is assumed to exceed 1. The second part 
of (4) is a subutility function defined over leisure time, where H  denotes the total time 
available per period and h  denotes the statutory working time. For simplicity we shall assume 
that both parameters, H  and h , assume value 1.   is a weight that households give to leisure 
relative to consumption. In order to simplify the framework, we assume that working time 
regulation prevents free choice of working hours. Households can thus choose between working 
and not working, which is captured in an indicator variable  , which is equal to 1 in the former 
case and 0 in the latter case. 
 
Household i  maximizes the utility function in (4) subject to the following budget constraint:  
 
 ,)(1)}(1,{max iiwwypxp iaipiiiyix    0.,   (5) 
 
On the left-hand side is a standard expression for the cost of consumption bundle, whereas on the 
right-hand side is a non-standard expression for income earned per period, which also reflects the 
labor market choices that consumers face. Suppose first that consumer prefers activity to 
inactivity, i.e. i  equals 1. In this case, she still faces the choice of sector of employment, which 
is made upon comparison of earned wages in the two sectors. piw  and aiw  denote the wage 
rates earned per period in the prior and alternative sector of employment, respectively. For 
example, if worker stays employed in sector x , then piw  equals to .xw  Alternatively, if 
worker, initially employed in sector x , moves to sector y , she earns a wage equal to )(1 iwy 
. Here i  is the time lost in inter-sectoral mobility, such as search, re-training or commuting 
costs.   is a parameter that determines the size of mobility costs, while i  is an index of 
workers. Although in reality consumers may choose to use either working or leisure time for 
investment in mobility and that mobility may also entail other types of costs, such as monetary or 
psychical costs, the qualitative nature of results derived below does not hinge on assumed form of 
mobility costs. The key feature of assumed form of mobility costs is introduction of worker 
heterogeneity. We think of index i  as a proxy for age, which implies that older workers face 
higher mobility costs. This assumption is readily justified. On one hand, over the work cycle, 
workers gradually lose general human capital, which is necessary for re-training. On the other 
hand, older workers may be less familiar with various search channels and are more likely to be 
tied to a specific location through ownership of housing. Moreover, older workers have shorter 
remaining life spans, which implies lower values of investments in mobility.
5
 
 
Suppose next that worker prefers inactivity, i.e. i  equals 0. In this case, the government 
provides non-employment benefits. We assume that the size of these benefits depends on 
parameter   and an index of worker. Thus, non-employment benefits introduce another type of 
heterogeneity of workers. This assumption can be justified by actual institutional arrangements 
prevalent in Central and Eastern European countries (see Boeri and Terrell, 2002; Vodopivec et 
al., 2005), which typically entitled older workers to more generous non-employment benefits. 
Namely, the rules that determined entitlements typically related the amount and length of both 
unemployment benefits and severance payments to age. Moreover, an early retirement option was 
typically given only to workers older than some statutory minimum age. 
 
The solution to the utility-maximization problem given by the objective function in (4) and the 
budget constraint in (5) can be found in two steps. In the first step, we determine the demand 
functions for both goods, which are then used in the second step – calculation of indirect utility 
functions related to different labor market choices. The demand functions are obtained from the 
first order conditions for utility maximization. These have a well-known form for CES utility 
function:  
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where demand functions of consumer i , dix  and ,
d
iy  depend on the relative price of goods 
and combined income and non-employment benefits ( iI ).
6
 The expression for income depends 
on the labour market choices that workers make. In general, there are five different choices that 
workers can make and thus five different types of workers. However, since changes in the 
relative wage are symmetric, it is sufficient to consider only one direction of wage change. In 
particular, we shall assume that price liberalization terminates preferential treatment of sector x  
and consequently to reduction of wage in sector x . Given this assumption, we are left with four 
different groups of workers. In the first group are workers that stay in sector x  and earn wage 
rate and income xw . In the second group are workers that move from sector x  to sector y  
and earn income )(1 iwy  . In the third group are workers that move from sector x  to 
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 We recognize that proper treatment of time to invest consideration requires introduction of vintage human capital 
and overlapping generations structure. This would, however, greatly complicate the model without changing the 
substantive results of much simpler model that we propose. 
6
 Note that assumed inability of workers to transfer resources between periods implies equality of individual income 
and expenditure. 
inactivity and earn i  and in the last group are workers that stay in sector y  and earn yw . 
 
As already noted, each labour market choice corresponds to a specific form of demand functions 
and thus also different indirect utility functions. Labour-market choice is made upon ranking the 
values of indirect utility functions. Given assumed pre-transition preferential tax treatment of 
sector x , after price liberalization workers employed in sector y  will not have incentive to 
move either to sector x  or to inactivity.
7
 On the other hand, workers in sector x  must 
compare the indirect utilities of three labour-market choices. The assumptions of increasing 
mobility costs and non-employment benefits with age imply that in equilibrium only the youngest 
workers move to sector y , the middle-aged workers stay in sector x  and the oldest workers 
become inactive. The comparison of indirect utility functions gives the following conditions for 
the youngest workers:  
 
 ,)(1 xy wiw  for xyii  , (6) 
 
where xyi  denotes the index of worker that is indifferent between staying in sector x  and 
moving to sector .y  On the other end of age distribution, only those workers employed in sector 
x  move to inactivity for which holds that nonemployment benefit exceeds the wage earned in 
sector reduced by the value of lost leisure time. Formally, this condition can be stated as  
 
 ,  xwi  for xuii  , (7) 
 
where xui  denotes the index of worker that is indifferent between staying in sector x  and 
becoming inactive. 
The aggregate demand functions are calculated as sums of individual demand functions. Hence, 
these are:  
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where the integral runs over all consumers. 
 
2.1.3  Government 
 
The government collects revenues by imposing sales tax, which is spent either on subsidies of 
firms' revenues or non-employment benefits to inactive workers. We assume that the government 
complies with the balanced budget constraint in each period: 
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 We shall assume that the highest non-employment benefits cannot exceed the income earned in sector y . This 
assumption is necessary in order to prevent outflows of workers from the sector y  as well. 
 ,= idiYpXp ttytyttxtxt    (9) 
 
where   denotes the set of inactive workers. We assume that in the pre-transition period 
government subsidizes revenues of sector x  and taxes revenues of sector y . In the transition 
period, government liberalizes prices by eliminating distortionary tax rates and applies one tax 
rate in both sectors. 
 
2.2  Pre-transition equilibrium 
 
Equilibrium in any period cannot be determined unless we make an assumption on the prior 
sectoral allocation of labour. Namely, the incentives for mobility between sectors and to 
inactivity depend on the interplay between prior labour allocation and current period tax policy. 
In order to focus on the transition period dynamics, we assume that prior labour allocation 
corresponds to current tax policy in a way that workers have no incentives to move from sector of 
initial employment. In other words, we assume a stationary pre-transition equilibrium. 
Furthermore, we assume that prevalent wage exceeds non-employment benefits for all workers 
and that no one prefers inactivity to work. This assumption normalizes the pre-transition 
inactivity to zero. 
 
We are now ready to characterize the pre-transition equilibrium. Since this is the first period in 
our model, all the variables for this period have sub-index 1. We select labour as a numeraire and 
set the wage rate to 1. Note again that we assume that socialist government preferred goods 
produced in sector x  and subsidized its revenues for which it raised resources by taxing the 
revenues of .y  These assumptions and the first order condition for the profit maximization give:  
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which implies that the relative price of good y  in terms of good x , ,/ 11 xy pp  exceeds 1 . 
Plugging the pricing equation (10) in the aggregate demand function (8), we get the relationship 
between the tax rates and output levels. The assumed form of production functions (1) also 
implies equality between output and employment levels:  
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Note that employment and output increase with increases in respective tax rates. In particular, as 
government imposes a positive tax rate on revenues generated in sector y  and thus a negative 
tax rate on revenues generated in sector x , the output and employment levels in sector x  
exceed those of sector .y  
 In order to complete the characterization of equilibrium, we need to establish the relationship 
between the tax rates. This relationship is obtained from the balanced budget constraint and the 
labor market clearing condition:  
 
 1=11 yx LL   (13) 
 
Since no worker opts for inactivity, the balanced budget constraint simpifies to 
 
 0.=111111 YpXp yyxx    
 
Using the pricing relations (10), the equilibrium output, the labor allocations given in (11) and 
(12) and the labor market clearing condition (13), we get the following relationship between the 
tax rates in the two sectors:  
 
 .)(1=)(1 111
1
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This relationship depends on the value of elasticity of substitution. For Cobb-Douglas utility with 
  equal to 1, there is a linear relationship between the tax rates. Specifically, an increase in 1y  
by one percentage point implies a decrease in 1x  by one percentage point. For values of   
exceeding 1, this relationship is non-linear. For values of   below 2.5, this relationship is 
monotonically decreasing for a wide range of 1y . In what follows, we shall consider only values 
of   for which higher 1y  corresponds to lower 1x . It is also important to note that higher 
values of   correspond to higher 1y  for given ,1x  which is a consequence of greater 
responsiveness of firms' revenues to changes in tax rates. 
 
2.3  Transition equilibrium 
 
We now turn to determination of equilibrium in transition period. All the variables for this 
period have sub-index 2. We start by assuming complete price liberalization, which government 
achieves by imposing equal tax rates for all sectors. As a consequence, the prices that firms set 
must change as well, which is evident from the modified price-setting equation: 
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Namely, the price of good x  must increase, whereas the price of good y  must decrease. These 
price shifts change the structure of aggregate demand in favour of good y . If workers faced no 
obstacles to mobility, they would move from sector x  to sector y  and the wage rates and 
prices in two sectors would equalize as well. However, we assumed that workers face mobility 
costs that increase with age (index) of workers. Hence, the wage rates and prices can no longer be 
equal in two sectors. The relative price of good x , 22/ yx pp  is thus equal to the relative wage 
rate in sector x , 22/ yx ww . 
 
The relative wage rate is determined by an arbitrage condition given in (6). Continuously 
increasing mobility costs ensure that there exists a worker with an index 2xyi , who is indifferent 
between staying in sector x  and moving to sector y . For this worker the wage rate earned in 
sector y  multiplied by the share of remaining time after mobility between sectors must be equal 
to the wage rate (and wage) earned in sector x :  
 
 .=)(1 222 xxyy wiw   (16) 
 
This equation segregates workers previously employed in sector x . Only those with index (age) 
below 2xyi  move to sector y , while older workers either stay in this sector or move to 
inactivity. Equation 15 implies that these differences in wages are also reflected in differences in 
prices across sectors. 
 
The second arbitrage condition stems from decisions of workers initially employed in sector x  
with index that exceeds 2xyi . These workers face sufficiently high mobility costs to have no 
incentive to move between sectors. From inequality (7) we know that only workers above certain 
age decide to become inactive. That is, continuously increasing non-employment benefits imply 
that for sufficiently high 2 , there exists a worker who is indifferent between inactivity and 
work in sector .x  We denote the index of this worker by 21 xux ii  . The arbitrage condition that 
relates non-employment benefits parameter and the wage rate in sector x  is:  
 
 .=)( 2212   xxux wii  (17) 
 
In order to calculate the equilibrium prices and allocations, we need to determine the indices of 
marginal workers, 2xyi  and 2xui . For this purpose, we need to use labour and final goods market 
clearing conditions. The goods market clearing conditions equate the aggregate demand and 
supply functions. However, due to Walras law, we only use one of these conditions. Namely, 
using the expressions for aggregate demand (8) and aggregate supply of labour, the good x  
market clearing condition is: 
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Here 2I  is the aggregate income that is a sum of incomes for four groups of workers: i) the 
young who move from sector x  to sector y  and earn wage )(1 iwy  , ii) the middle-aged 
who stay in sector x  and earn wage ,2xw  iii) the old who move from sector x  to inactivity 
and receive nonemployment benefits i2  and iv) all workers that are employed in sector .y  
Formally, the aggregate income is:  
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Here we have used the same ordering of workers as above. Note also that normalization of 
aggregate labor time to 1 implies that indices, or differences between indices, represent labor 
shares. For example, 1xi  is an index of the last worker employed in sector x  in the first period 
and the share of labor engaged in this sector in the pre-transition period. Similarly, 2xyi  is a 
share of young movers from sector x  to sector y , 2xui  is the share of older workers that move 
to inactivity and 2 2 /2 xyi  is a share of labor lost due to inter-sectoral mobility. Combining pricing 
relations (15), (16) and (17) with goods (18) and labour market-clearing conditions:  
 ,= 2212 xyxuxx iiii   (20) 
allows us to eliminate the wage rates, the prices and 2  from the goods market clearing 
condition. We obtain the first of the two equations with two unknowns, 2xyi  and 2xui  , that 
determine the transition equilibrium:  
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The second equation that determines the equilibrium is obtained by combining the balanced 
government budget constraint 
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with pricing relations (15), (16) and (17), production function (1) and labor market clearing 
condition (20), to:  
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The system of equations (21) and (22) determines the shares of workers in sector x  that move 
either between sectors, 2xyi , or to inactivity, 2xui . These, in turn, determine the equilibrium 
output levels, the prices and the wage rates. Since the solution to this system can not be expressed 
analytically, we examine the role of various parameters of the model in a simple simulation 
exercise. However, our highly stylized model is not suitable for calibration to real transition 
economies, which makes the choice of parameters arbitrary, serving only illustrative purpose. 
 2.3.1  Simulation exercise 
 
In order to calculate the equilibrium allocations and prices, we need to choose the values of 
parameters. We start with parameters that determine the pre-transition allocation of labour, which 
also affects the transition equilibrium. From equations (10), (11), (12) and (14) follows that only 
two parameters, elasticity of substitution and sales tax rate in one of the sectors, determine this 
equilibrium. In the baseline scenario, for which we summarize parameter values in Table 1, we 
assume elasticity of substitution equal to 1 and a 15 percent subsidy rate on revenues generated in 
sector x  in the pre-transition period. This subsidy rate corresponds to a 15 percent tax rate on 
revenues generated in sector y . For these parameter values and the wage rate set to 1, we have 
employment and output levels in sectors x  and ,y  summarized in the first column of Table 2, 
equal to 0.575 and 0.425, respectively. The prices of goods x  and y  that support these 
allocations are 0.870 and 1.177, respectively. In other words, preferential subsidy given to firms 
in sector x  allows them to set lower price and increase employment and output by 15 percent at 
the expense of employment and output in sector y . 
 
Now that we have determined the pre-transition labour allocation, we need to choose the 
remaining values of parameters that affect the transition equilibrium. In particular, we need to 
specify the weight of leisure in the utility function, the common tax rate on firms' revenues, and 
the mobility cost parameter,  . In the baseline scenario, we set   to 0.35, which implies that 
additional unit of leisure increases utility by the same amount as an increase of consumption of 
both goods from, say, 0.50 to 0.85 units.   is set to 3, which on one hand implies zero mobility 
cost for the youngest worker in sector x , while the oldest worker faces prohibitive mobility cost 
equal to 2.1 units of leisure time. The common sales tax rate in transition is set to 0.065, which in 
equilibrium implies 2  equal to 1.343. This gives a range of non-employment benefits between 
64.9 percent of the wage rate in sector x  for the youngest and 77.2 percent for the oldest mover 
to inactivity.
8
 
 
The transition period prices and allocations for this scenario are summarized in the lower part of 
the first column of Table 2. In comparison to the pre-transition levels, the output and employment 
levels in sector x  decline from 0.575 to 0.466, a 18.96 percent decline, whereas the output and 
employment in sector y  increase from 0.425 to 0.441, a 3.76 percent increase. As the decline of 
employment in sector x  exceeds the increase of employment in sector y , there is a 10.2 
percent aggregate employment decline. A large part of output decline in sector x  is related to 
outflow of workers to inactivity ( 2xui  is 0.091), although there is also a small part related to 
inter-sectoral mobility of workers ( 2xyi  is 0.017). The share of labour lost due to high mobility 
costs is relatively low ( 2 2 /2 xyi  is 0.0004). The prices that support these allocations changed as 
well. An increase in production of good y  is consistent with consumer optimization only if the 
relative price of this good decreases. Moreover, while in the pre-transition period workers in two 
sectors earned the same wage rate, in transition period the wage rate in sector y  exceeds the 
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 Note that we consider only tax rates that are to the left of the maximum of the Laffer curve. Over that range of 
parameter values, higher tax rate corresponds to higher non-employment benefits. 
wage rate in sector x  by 5.52 percent. In other words, wage inequality increases due to mobility 
costs that determine the sectoral wage gap. The change in aggregate output or real GDP depends 
on the choice of appropriate weights for the two goods. Following the standard methodology of 
statistical offices, we use the prices applicable in the pre-transition period. Due to relative 
scarcity of good y  in the pre-transition period, the relative price of good y  in this period is 
higher than in the transition period. Thus, while output of good y  increases in transition period 
and output of good x  decreases, the real GDP decline is smaller than the aggregate labor 
decline. For the baseline parameter values, the aggregate output decline amounted to 7.45 
percent, which is 1.70 percentage points less than the aggregate employment decline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table  1: Baseline parameter values 
    
Parameter  Description Value 
   Elasticity of substitution 1.000 
1w  
 Pre-transition nominal wage rate 1.000 
2xw   Transition nominal wage rate in sector x  1.000 
   Weight of leisure in utility function 0.350 
1x   Pre-transition subsidy rate on revenue in sector x  -0.150 
1y   Pre-transition tax rate on revenue in sector y  0.150 
2   Transition tax rate on firms revenues 0.065 
   Adjustment cost parameter 3.000 
 
    
Table  2: The equilibrium allocations and prices for the baseline parameter values and 
alternative assumptions  
   
 Baseline 
parameter 
values 
Deviations from the baseline scenario 
 0.20=1y  1.50=  5.00=  0.10=2  0.45=  
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
11 = xx LQ  0.575 0.600 0.623 0.575 0.575 0.575 
11 = yy LQ  0.425 0.400 0.377 0.425 0.425 0.425 
1xp  0.870 0.833 0.870 0.870 0.870 0.870 
1yp  1.177 1.250 1.216 1.177 1.177 1.177 
1GDP  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
22 = xx LQ  0.466 0.475 0.492 0.470 0.438 0.457 
22 = yy LQ  0.442 0.430 0.412 0.438 0.431 0.438 
2xyi  0.017 0.032 0.037 0.013 0.006 0.014 
2xui  0.091 0.093 0.094 0.092 0.131 0.104 
222 = yx LLL   0.908 0.906 0.904 0.908 0.892 0.895 
2xp  1.069 1.087 1.069 1.069 1.111 1.069 
2yp  1.129 1.201 1.204 1.147 1.131 1.115 
CPGDP2  0.925 0.934 0.929 0.924 0.888 0.913 
2yw  1.055 1.105 1.125 1.072 1.017 1.043 
2
2 /2 xyi  4
410  15 410  20 410  4 410  0.5 410  3 410  
2  1.343 1.282 1.228 1.345 1.463 1.167 
Note: Columns (2)-(6) differ from the baseline scenario only in the value of parameter 
in the head of the table. 
 
 
Next, we examine the effects of parameter variation on equilibrium outcomes. We compare 
equilibria by varying one parameter, while keeping all remaining parameter values in line with 
the baseline scenario. First, we consider greater initial miss-allocation. In our model, this is 
achieved by an increase in the tax rate on revenues of sector y  from 15 to 20 percent. The 
equilibria that correspond to higher value of 1y  are summarized in the second column of Table 
2. Higher 1y  is reflected in greater employment and output levels in sector x  and lower 
employment and output levels in sector y  in the pre-transition period. As a consequence, 
removal of distortions creates greater incentives for mobility of workers from sector x  to both 
sector y  and inactivity. Therefore, we can observe greater employment and output decline in 
sector x , and greater employment and output surge in sector y  in the transition period. 
Nevertheless, the size of the aggregate employment decline is greater. Since greater distortions 
imply that more workers bear mobility costs, there is also greater wage inequality. At the same 
time we observe lower endogenously determined 2 . This result suggests that countries with 
worse miss-allocation of labour could not afford to pay as generous non-employment benefits as 
countries with smaller distortions. The most important, but also controversial, prediction of the 
model is related to the change in real GDP in response to an increase in 1y . The model predicts 
that this relationship is negative, which counters empirical observation that countries with worse 
initial conditions experienced greater output decline. It is important to note that we obtained our 
theoretical result by applying the pre-transition prices, which is theoretically equivalent to 
applying GDP deflators on nominal GDP growth rates. However, one should bear in mind 
well-documented measurement errors pertaining to calculation of change in real GDP. Both 
under-reporting of activity in small and growing firms and over-estimated measures of inflation 
due to coverage of primarily large firms with above average price increases could lead to 
overestimated output decline (Bartholdy, 1997).
9
 Moreover, the extent of real GDP growth could 
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 Inability of the model to replicate the observed empirical relationship between the initial distortions and the extent 
be substantially reduced in a proper multi-period setting in which adjustment of workers could 
not take place within an interval of one time period. Nevertheless, the prediction that countries 
with greater distortions could experience smaller output decline raises concern and suggests that 
the proposed model can only complement the existing explanations of output decline, rather than 
replace them. This conviction is reinforced when higher values of elasticity of substitution are 
considered. In the fourth column of Table 2 we show the pre-transition and transition equilibria 
for   equal to 1.5 and conclude that higher elasticity of substitution leads to greater dispersion 
of prices and miss-allocation of labour in the pre-transition period and greater decline of 
aggregate employment, while real GDP decline is in fact lower. 
 
Next, we consider variation of parameter that reflects mobility cost,  , which implies a 
proportionate change of mobility costs for all workers in sector x . The equilibria that correspond 
to this type of deviation from the baseline scenario are summarized in the fourth column of Table 
2. An increase in   to 5, does not affect the pre-transition equilibrium. However, since all 
workers in sector x  face higher mobility costs, the transition equilibrium exhibits a smaller 
share of workers in sector x  that move to sector y  and a greater share of workers that become 
inactive. The share of workers that stay in sector x  is thus higher, while the share of workers 
employed in sector y  is lower. The net effect of higher adjustment costs is lower aggregate 
employment and lower real GDP. Moreover, higher   also implies greater difference between 
hourly wage rates and thus greater dispersion of income between households. It is also important 
to note on the relationship between   and employment lost due to mobility costs, 2 2 /2 xyi . 
While higher   reduces 2xyi , the direction of change of aggregate mobility costs depends on 
response of 2xyi  to  . In general, the relationship between   and aggregate mobility costs is 
hump-shaped. For low values of   its increases lead to higher aggregate mobility costs and vice 
versa. In extreme case, where   is prohibitive for all workers in sector x  and there are 
insufficient benefits to participation in hidden economy, no worker would decide to move from 
sector x  and employment (and output) in all sectors would remain unchanged. In summary, for 
moderate values of  , the model predicts that countries with higher inter-sectoral mobility costs 
should exhibit greater output decline, greater income inequality and higher share of inactive 
workers. 
 
The third experiment is variation of the common tax rate on the transition equilibrium. As higher 
tax rate corresponds to higher parameter for non-employment benefits, we interpret this 
experiment as a variation of generosity of non-employment benefits system.
10
 The results for 
                                                                                                                                                                            
of output decline is related to the assumption that the socialist governments achieved the desired allocations of 
resources only by distortionary taxation. This assumption, however, does not include the possibility that government 
used a ban on entry of private firms that could increase the variety of products. In that situation, sectoral output 
would not respond to a change in relative prices, but rather to liberalization of entry of firms. More importantly, 
changes of prices of goods could only be measured for existing firms. Therefore, application of GDP deflators, based 
on prices of continuing firms, to nominal GDP changes could yield greater output decline especially in those 
countries with worse initial distortions. 
10
 The standard Laffer curve features a hump-shaped relationship between the tax rate and the total tax revenue. The 
setup of this model features this relationship. However, as an increase in the tax rate increases the outflow of workers 
from sector x , the relative price of this good increases and thus eliminates the incentive for outflow to more 
workers and further output decline. As a consequence, the relationship between the tax rate and the mass of taxes is 
only positive in this setup. The case where this relationship could be negative is rulled out as it would feature a 
higher 
2 , equal to 0.10, which corresponds to 2  equal to 1.463, are summarized in the fifth 
column of Table 2. Higher non-employment benefits make inactivity preferred choice for more 
workers in sector .x  This decreases the share of employed workers in sector x , which implies 
that good x  is relatively more scarce and its relative price is higher. As a result of, the wage gap 
between sectors and wage inequality are smaller, which reduces the incentives for inter-sectoral 
mobility and employment in sector y . The aggregate employment and the real GDP that 
correspond to higher non-employment benefits are both lower. Thus, in conclusion, this model 
predicts that countries that offered more generous non-employment benefits to inactive workers 
should exhibit greater output declines and lower wage inequality. 
 
Lastly, we consider the effects of variation of relative value of leisure, captured by parameter  . 
This parameter allows an alternative interpretation, namely, a measure of relative productivity in 
formal as opposed to informal economy. As countries with higher relative productivity in formal 
economy are typically more developed with higher GDP, the relative value of leisure may be 
lower. In other words, variation of   may capture differences in the initial level of GDP per 
capita. In Table 2, we report the transition equilibrium that corresponds to the value of   equal 
to 0.45, which is higher than in the baseline scenario. An increase of relative value of leisure has 
similar effect on labour flows as an increase of transition-period tax rate. Namely, the share of 
workers that stay employed in the two sectors decreases, which results in higher aggregate 
employment and output decline. Higher outflow of workers from sector x  to inactivity also 
implies lower wage inequality. The only difference is that non-employment benefits parameter 
decreases, which is a consequence of lower taxes collected due to outflow of workers to 
inactivity. In conclusion, countries with lower income per capita should exhibit greater output 
decline as inactivity may be a more attractive option for greater share of workers in declining 
sectors. 
 
2.4  Trade embargo 
 
Above we show that the model of price liberalization predicts that countries with greater initial 
distortions, ceteris paribus, should exhibit smaller output decline due to offsetting effect of 
sectoral changes in production and initial relative prices. In fact, under extremely large 
distortions, we could observe even real output surge. The second prediction that runs against the 
evidence is that the real GDP decline is smaller than the aggregate labour decline. In reality, we 
have observed that output decline is typically greater than that of aggregate employment, which 
suggests that other mechanisms may have played more important role. 
 
One important peace of evidence is that countries with greater export shares to CMEA countries 
exhibited greater output decline. Djankov (1998) pointed out that FSU countries imposed import 
tariffs or even complete bans of imports. This trigger is easily analysed within our setup as an 
introduction (or an increase) of import tariffs also works through changes in relative prices. The 
appeal of this trigger of relative price changes is movement of prices and quantities in the same 
direction rather than in the opposite when relative prices change due to distortionary taxation, and 
consequently greater aggregate output decline.
11
 
                                                                                                                                                                            
decline in output also in sector y . 
11
 Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2016) analyze show that entry of China in WTO in 2001 lead to important changes in 
 In order to illustrate this point, we assume a small open economy with exogenously given relative 
prices. Let us denote the relative price in CMEA as Cyx pp )(  and assume that its value exceeds 
1 . Exogenously given relative price allows us to determine the pattern of pre-transition 
specialization. Keeping the same form of production function as above, the relative productivity 
of two sectors is equal, which combined with common wage rate across sectors implies that the 
relative price in closed economy is equal to 1. Thus, given higher relative price of good x  in 
CMEA, the country completely specializes in its production.
12
 That is, output and employment in 
sectors x  and y  are 1 and 0, respectively. The pre-transition period levels of exports and 
imports are determined by plugging the aggregate demand functions given in (8) in the balanced 
international trade constraint:  
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where we used the fact that xpwI == . Thus, higher relative price of good x  implies higher 
exports share. Similarly, the pre-transition imports is increasing in relative price:  
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Let us now consider the effect of trade embargo that takes place in the transition period. The 
equilibrium is determined in the same way as above. The only peculiarity is the extreme initial 
condition, which features complete specialization, and implies the same change in sectoral 
employment and outptu, irrespective of the change in initial relative prices. An important 
difference is, however, the prediction that the change in real GDP is increasing with relative price 
of x . For higher relative price of x  greater weight is given to the decline in production of x  
and lower weight is given to the production of good y , which confirms our point. This result 
suggests that trade embargos (or increases in tariffs) likely had important effects on output 
decline in the FSU countries and possibly in CEE countries. 
 
3  A model of wage liberalization 
 
In the previous section, we analysed output and employment dynamics in a model that featured 
simultaneous price and wage liberalization. The price liberalization acted as a trigger for the 
relative price change, while wage liberalization was necessary to enable also changes in wages, 
                                                                                                                                                                            
employment of US workers and output. These effects are in our model analogous to trade embargo, but with the 
opposite direction of adjustment of workers.      
12
 While complete specialization is extreme, this is a consequence of preserving the same structure of economy as in 
the model of price liberalization. Modelling more complicated trade structure would necessarily yield more 
complicated expressions without changing the qualitative nature of results. 
which induced inter-sectoral labour reallocation. In this section we show that wage liberalization 
alone could have generated labour mobility that resulted in simultaneous output decline. 
Moreover, unlike in the model with price liberalization, this model predicts that output decline 
takes place in all firms simultaneously. In order to show this, we modify the model developed 
before in two directions. First, we assume only one production sector with firms producing one 
homogeneous good. Second, we assume that workers differ in terms of skills. The former 
assumption simplifies the model, while the latter introduces heterogeneity of labour in terms of 
acquired human capital. As before, we shall assume that socialist government uses distortionary 
taxation that affects the skill composition in the labour force. This assumption is clearly not 
realistic as socialist governments typically achieved wage compression by direct wage 
determination. However, it is a convenient assumption in order to preserve a common modelling 
framework in the two periods.
13
 The presentation of the setup of the model and key results 
follows the same structure as above. 
 
3.1  Setup 
 
3.1.1  Producers 
 
We assume that firms produce the final good according to the standard Cobb-Douglas production 
function with two production factors:  
 
 .= 1  us llq  (23) 
 
Here ,q  sl  and ul  denote output, skilled and unskilled labour, respectively. As above, we shall 
omit time indices in the presentation of the setup.   and 1  are elasticities of output with 
respect to skilled and unskilled workers. Again, we assume costless entry and exit of firms, which 
combined with constant returns to scale production function leaves market structure 
indeterminate. The profit of the representative firm is:  
 
 ,= uuss lwlwpq   (24) 
 
where sw  and uw  denote the gross wage rates for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. 
We choose the composite good to be a numeraire and set its price, p , to one. The first-order 
conditions for profit maximization are:  
 
 ,=11 sus wll
   (25) 
 .=)(1 uus wll
   (26) 
 
From these conditions, we obtain firm-level demand functions, which have, due to linear 
homogenity of production function, the same form as aggregate production functions:  
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 In order to achieve no unemployment among low-skill workers, direct wage determination needs a 
complementary intervention -- direct employment determination. If governments did not intervene in such way, 
low-skill workers would be unemployed. This phenomenon was often referred to as latent unemployment. 
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Here dsL  and 
d
uL  denote aggregate labor demand functions for high- and low-skilled workers, 
respectively, and Q  denotes the aggregate output. These expressions imply that labor demand 
increases with increases in aggregate output and weight in utility function and decreases with 
increases in gross wage rates. 
 
3.1.2  Households 
 
The economy is populated by a continuum of households, whose index (age) is evenly distributed 
on an interval between 0 and 1. The utility maximization problem for these households is similar 
to that given in (4) and (5). However, since we no longer have two types of goods, the utility 
function simplifies to:  
 
 0,>),(=),(  iiii vHqvqu   (29) 
 
where iq  denotes a quantity of the composite good consumed by worker i . The labour market 
choices that individuals make are reflected in budget constraints with one important difference. In 
the two-sector model, workers made choice between sectors of employment and inactivity, 
whereas here only low-skilled workers face a choice on investment in skills and inactivity as they 
represent a group that experiences a negative income shock after wage liberalization. In 
particular, since elimination of distortionary tax on wages increases the relative wage of 
high-skill workers, low-skill workers decide between increasing their human capital, not 
investing in human capital, but staying employed, and becoming inactive, while high-skill 
workers face no trade-off and just consume their income. The budget constraint that reflects these 
choices of low-skill workers is:  
 
 ,)(1)})(1(1),(1{max iviwwvq issuuii     with 0,,   (30) 
 
where )(1 uuw   is the net wage rate for worker that preserves the skill-type, while )(1 ssw   
is the net wage rate if skill-level improves. Since we assume no adjustment cost for high-skill 
workers to become low-skill workers and government sets below market skill-premium in the 
pre-transition period, we have only four types of workers. In the first group are young low-skill 
workers that decide to invest in human capital and earn net wage ))(1(1 iw ss   . In the second 
group are middle-aged low-skill workers that do not invest in human capital, but decide to remain 
active and earn )(1 uuw  . In the third group are older workers that prefer inactivity as they 
receive sufficiently high non-employment benefits. The last group of workers are high-skill 
workers that earn )(1 ssw   and have no incentive to make a change.
14
 Workers with low 
human capital endowments compare indirect utilities of three competing options. As above, we 
assume that both the cost of investment in human capital as well as non-employment benefits 
increase with age (as indexed by i ), ensuring that only the youngest individuals will choose to 
invest in their human capital, the oldest workers will become inactive, while the middle-aged 
workers will find it optimal to maintain both their skill-level and type of employment. The choice 
of the youngest workers to invest in education is driven entirely by the following condition:  
 
 )(1))(1(1 uuss wiw   for usii   (31) 
 
where usi  indexes the oldest worker still choosing to invest in skill improvements. On the other 
end of the distribution, the choice between continued work as low-skill worker and inactivity is 
governed by:  
 
 )(1 uuwi    for  cii   (32) 
 
where ci  denotes the worker that is indifferent between staying employed and becoming 
inactive. 
 
Finally, the aggregate demand function, calculated as a sum of individual demand functions is 
simplified by the fact that the composite good price is set to one. 
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3.1.3  Government 
 
We assume that government collects revenues by imposing a tax on gross wage and uses these 
either for gross wage subsidies or non-employment benefits. Thus, the balanced-budget constraint 
is:  
 ,= idiLwLw uuusss    (34) 
 
where   denotes the set of inactive workers. As already noted, we assume that government 
cross-subsidizes wages of low-skilled workers in the pre-transition period in order to ensure low 
wage inequality. This is reflected in a positive tax rate on wage earned by high-skilled workers 
and a negative tax rate on wages earned by low-skilled workers. In transition period, government 
liberalizes wage determination and applies a common tax rate on gross wages in order to finance 
non-employment benefits. 
 
3.2  Pre-transition equilibrium 
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 The remaining alternatives are, of course, easily eliminated as educated workers ( h ) have no incentive to become 
inactive nor can they lose their human capital. 
We start with determination of pre-transition equilibrium. As before, we assume a stationary skill 
structure. In other words, labour income taxation in the pre-transition period is such that no 
low-skilled worker is better off by investing in additional human capital or moving to inactivity. 
This is true only when equality between net wage rates of low- and high-skilled workers holds:  
 
 )(1=)(1 1111 uuss ww    (35) 
 
and when the oldest low-skilled worker, who is entitled to the highest non-employment benefit, 
does not prefer to move to inactivity. 
 
Besides relationship between net wages, the equilibrium is determined by the first order 
conditions from firms' profit maximization, labor market clearing condition and the 
balanced-budget constraint. The ratio between first-order conditions, (25) and (26), we get the 
relationship between employment shares of low- and high-skilled workers:  
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Combining (35) and (36), this ratio can be expressed as a function of tax rates:  
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While one of the tax rates can be set freely, the other one must be set in line with the 
balanced-budget constraint. In equilibrium, no low-skilled worker prefers inactivity to work, 
which simplifies the budget constraint to:  
 
 0.=uuusss LwLw    
 
Using the relationship between gross wage rates (35) and the fact that the sum of low- and 
high-skilled workers equals to one:  
 
 1,=11 us LL   (38) 
 
we get a familiar relationship between the tax rates:  
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We combine equations (37), (38) and (39) to calculate the shares of low- and high-skilled 
workers: 
  
 ),(11= 11 suL    
 ).(1= 11 ssL    
 The corresponding aggregate output is:  
 
 ,))(1(1)(1= 111
   ssKQ  (40) 
 
where K  is    1)(1 , the level of output in the case of no distortionary taxation. 
 
In summary, in the pre-transition period government pursued the goal of low income inequality 
by using distortionary taxation. Higher tax rates on gross wages of high-skilled workers and thus 
higher subsidy rates on gross wages of low-skilled workers lead to lower share of high-skilled 
workers and higher share of low-skilled workers. However, an unwanted consequence of 
distortionary taxation was lower aggregate output. 
 
3.3  Transition equilibrium 
 
In transition period, government liberalizes wage setting by equalizing the tax rates on wages of 
two types of workers. For given pre-transition skill structure that corresponds to high tax rate on 
wage of high-skilled labour and low tax rate on low-skill labor, the tax rate equalization increases 
the skill premium. Therefore, some low-skilled workers now find alternative options, such as 
investing in human capital or becoming inactive, more attractive. In particular, since both costs of 
investment and non-employment benefits increase with age of workers, only young low-skilled 
workers decide to invest in human capital, middle-aged workers remain low-skilled and older 
low-skilled workers choose inactivity. Outflow of workers to inactivity and time spent in the 
process of education reduce the share of low-skilled workers. Consequently, aggregate output 
declines. In the remainder of this section, we derive the system of equations that determines this 
equilibrium. 
 
We start by specifying the equilibrium relationship between the wage rates of two types of 
workers. As investment cost increases with age of workers, there exists a worker who is 
indifferent between investing in education and remaining active as a low-skill worker. For this 
worker, the net wage earned as high-skilled worker must be equal to the net wage earned as a 
low-skilled worker. Equality of tax rates simplifies (31) to:  
 
 .=)(1 222 uuss wiw   (41) 
 
As before, the cost of education for the marginal worker that invests in education determines the 
skill premium. Note that the index of the marginal worker also equals to the share of workers that 
decide to invest in education. 
 
On the other end of age distribution, there exists a low-skilled worker who is indifferent between 
moving to inactivity and staying active as a low-skill worker. From this condition, we get the 
relationship between net wages and government benefits:  
 
 ,)(1=)( 2221   uuxu wii  (42) 
 
where 21 uxu ii   is an index of the youngest worker that chooses inactivity. 
 
We now turn to final good market-clearing condition that equalizes the aggregate demand to the 
aggregate supply. The demand is a sum of individual demand functions for four groups of 
workers. In the first group are young low-skill workers that decide to invest in education. Their 
index ranges between 0 and 2usi , the index of the oldest worker that invests in education. These 
workers earn the wage rate of high-skilled workers, ,)(1 22 sw  although they earn lower wage 
due to time used for schooling. In the second group are the middle-aged low-skilled workers that 
do not invest in education and thus earn 22)(1 uw . Their index runs between 2usi  and 21 uxu ii 
. In the third group are old low-skilled workers that have an option to receive high 
non-employment benefits. The index of these workers runs between 21 uxu ii   and 1ui . In the last 
group are all high-skilled workers. The aggregate demand for output good by these groups of 
workers is a sum of their after tax income:  
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which can be integrated to:  
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The aggregate supply is:  
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Using the arbitrage conditions (41) and (42) and the first-order conditions (26), we get the first of 
the two non-linear equations that determine the shares of workers that invest in skills and workers 
that become inactive:  
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The second equation is obtained from the balanced-budget constraint. This constraint is in 
transition period equal to:  
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which can be further simplified using the arbitrage conditions (41) and (42) and the first-order 
conditions (26): 
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 The system of equations (46) and (47) determines the indices of marginal workers 2usi  and 2xui . 
From these we can determine the aggregate output and wage rates. Again, as this model yields no 
closed form solution, we analyze the model via simulations. 
 
3.4  Analysis of the model 
 
Analogous to the analysis of price liberalization we turn to a simulation exercise to study the 
implications of wage liberalization in transition. In order to determine the pre-transition 
equilibrium, we need to choose two parameters, the tax rate on skilled workers' wage 1u  (or 
alternatively the tax rate on unskilled wages) and the weight of skilled in the production function, 
 . Table 3 summarizes the baseline parameter values, where the subsidy rate on unskilled labour 
is equal to 0.2, while the weight in production function is 0.4. Note that price level of final good 
is normalized to 1. Under the baseline parameter values the respective shares of skilled and 
unskilled workers are equal 0.720 and 0.280, while the output is 0.493. The preferential 
subsidies, given to unskilled labour, combined with the taxes on skilled labour, ensure that the net 
wages of all workers are the same. For the assumed values of parameters, the gross wages are 
equal to 0.33. 
 
Using the pre-transition labour allocation, we can calculate the transition equilibrium by choosing 
the values of remaining parameters. The weight of leisure in the utility function ( ) is set to 0.3, 
the parameter that determines the distribution of cost of education ( ) to 2, while the common 
income tax rate in the transition period ( 2 ) is 8%. Properties of the transition equilibrium are 
summarized in the bottom part of Table 4. A comparison of the pre-transition and transition 
equilibrium reveals that even though the size of the skilled labour force increases marginally, the 
size of the total labour force decreases from 1 to 0.816. This decline was brought on by a 
relatively large flow to inactivity (0.182), while the effect of the actual cost of 'vertical' labour 
mobility was marginal at best (
2
2 /2 usi  0.0016= ). The large outflow to inactivity (of unskilled 
workers) also adversely affects the production level, which declines from 0.493 to 0.416. The 
reallocation of labour from unskilled to either skilled labour or to inactivity is supported by a 
change in the gross wages of the two groups of workers. The net and gross wage of skilled are 
0.489 and 0.532, respectively, while the corresponding wages of unskilled are 0.456 and 0.496. 
 
We also consider how equilibria change in response to different parameter values. As before, we 
change value of one parameter, while keeping the values of remaining parameters unchanged. 
First, we start by increasing the subsidy given to unskilled gross wages from 0.200 to 0.300. This 
increases initial distortion to skill composition as the share of unskilled labour increases from 
0.720 in the baseline case to 0.780 in this scenario. The removal of those distortions in transition 
subsequently motivates greater mobility both from unskilled to skilled labor as well as to 
inactivity. While initial output is lower, also the size of output decline in transition period is 
lower in both absolute and relative terms. The share of workers moving to inactivity increases 
from 0.182 in the baseline example to 0.198, and the share of workers choosing to invest in skill 
improvements more than doubles. The decline of aggregate employment is, consequently, also 
larger, while an increase in inequality is larger. 
 
Consider next an increase in the elasticity of substitution between two skill types from 0.40 to 
0.50. This change causes slightly greater output decline and lower employment decline. This is a 
consequence of greater initial share of skilled workers, which do not need to invest in education 
and are not attracted to inactivity. Wage inequality is also smaller in this case, as 
non-employment benefits reduce unskilled to similar levels for skilled and unskilled workers. The 
remaining parameters have similar effects on output and employment dynamics as in the model 
with price liberalization. An increase of adjustment costs in the form of education and training 
reduces investments in skills and consequently increases output decline, while it increases wage 
inequality. Both increases in transition period tax rate and value of leisure lead to greater output 
decline and lower wage inequality, as more workers are attracted to inactivity. 
 
Table  3: Baseline parameter values 
    
Parameter  Description Value 
   Elasticity of substitution in production 0.400 
1P   Pre-transition price 1.000 
   Weight of leisure in utility function 0.300 
1u   Pre-transition subsidy rate on unskilled labor wages -0.200 
1s   Pre-transition tax rate on revenue in sector y  0.300 
2   Transition tax rate on firms revenues 0.080 
   Adjustment cost parameter 2.000 
 
  
Table  4: The equilibrium allocations and prices for the baseline parameter values and 
alternative assumptions 
   
  Baseline 
parameter 
values  
  Deviations from the baseline scenario  
  0.30=1 u    0.50=    3.00=    0.15=2    0.4=   
Variable   (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)  
1Q     0.493    0.470    0.490    0.493    0.493    0.493  
1uL     0.720    0.780    0.600    0.720    0.720    0.720  
1sL     0.280    0.220    0.400    0.280    0.280    0.280  
11 = us ww     0.330    0.261    0.370    0.330    0.330    0.330  
2Q     0.416    0.405    0.412    0.415    0.358    0.361  
2usL     0.034    0.074    0.009    0.029    0.001    0.002  
2xuL     0.182    0.198    0.175    0.185    0.290    0.294  
222 = yx LLL      0.816    0.795    0.825    0.813    0.697    0.707  
2sw     0.532    0.562    0.504    0.539    0.511    0.512  
2uw     0.496    0.478    0.504    0.492    0.509    0.509  
2
2/2 xyL     1.6
310     7.7 310     0.1 310     1.6 310     6.2 710     6.9 610   
2     0.291    0.241    0.367    0.285    0.316    0.172  
 Note: Columns (2)-(6) differ from the baseline scenario only in the value of parameter  
 in the head of the table. 
 
  
 
 
4  Conclusion 
 
In this paper we develop two simple models that show how price and wage liberalization may 
have contributed to a part of the large aggregate output decline and an increase in income 
inequality in the early transition. The relationship between price liberalization and output decline 
is not a unique feature of our model (see Atkeson and Kehoe, 1996; Blanchard and Kremer, 
1997; Roland and Verdier, 1999 and Gomulka and Lane, 2001), but rather the proposed 
mechanism, which is  is consistent with a wide set of stylized facts relevant for the CEE 
countries. 
 
We interpret initial distortions as direct political control over prices, wages and allocations and 
price liberalization as complete elimination of these distortions. In particular, we model price 
liberalization as a shift of preferences from those of social planners to preferences of consumers. 
These assumptions are in line with empirical evidence (Vodopivec, 1994), but contrast Gomulka 
and Lane (2001), who model price liberalization as elimination of distortionary tax system. An 
important problem of their interpretation is also in calculation of real GDP growth according to 
standard statistical methods, which may even exhibit growth of output. 
 
According to our model, price liberalization alone is not sufficient for output decline. In order to 
comply with evidence on labor market flows during the early transition (Boeri and Flinn, 1999; 
Boeri, 2000a; Boeri and Terrell, 2002), we assume varying adjustment costs to labor mobility 
across different sectors and introduce non-employment benefits and reservation wage. Our 
explanation, however, differs from Atkeson and Kehoe (1996), who assume that adjustment costs 
are sufficiently low and investment horizon sufficiently long that workers are willing to bear 
adjustment costs. In their model, output decline is a consequence of investment in adjustment 
costs, which is inconsistent with observed low inter-firm, inter-sectoral and inter-occupational 
mobility and suggests that adjustment costs were not viable investments for the majority of 
workers. In addition to the interpretation of distortionary taxes, our model differs also from the 
other extreme model by Gomulka and Lane (2001), who assume prohibitive adjustment costs. 
Under this assumption alone, no worker would move between firms, which leads them to assume 
real wage rigidity. While this assumption is inconsistent with observed increase in wage 
inequality, it is also inconsistent with observed labour flows. If predetermined wages were indeed 
the cause of output decline, workers should have been forced to become inactive. Boeri (2000a) 
summarizes evidence that contradicts this assumption as labour flows were mostly voluntary. 
Hence, in our model, we assume that government provided non-employment benefits to workers 
and reservation wage earned in hidden economy. Both adjustment costs and non-employment 
benefits are positively related to age, which triggered young workers to move between sectors, 
middle-aged to stay in the same sector, while the oldest workers to become inactive. The decline 
of output and increased inequality are thus a consequence of trigger in the form of price 
liberalization and interplay between adjustment costs and non-employment benefits. The reduced 
labour supply due to increased inactivity leads also to aggregate output decline. In addition, wage 
liberalization that increased returns to education could alone be responsible for a part of decline 
as long as governments provided sufficiently high non-employment benefits.  
 
We conclude with the following observation. Lack of firm- and individual-level data for the early 
transition period prevent us from empirically testing which of these explanations is the most 
plausible. Hence we cannot provide evidence on the relative importance of different supply-side 
and demand-side mechanisms. As it was argued already in Roland (2000), we cannot attribute the 
entire output decline to just one or the other mechanism. Hence, the aggregate demand shocks 
that worked either through expected income changes or trade embargos could be held responsible 
for a part of output decline. Nevertheless, consistency of our theoretical predictions with 
observed dynamics of sectoral employment and output, labor flows and wage inequality suggests 
that our proposed mechanisms may have played some complementary role in output decline. 
Hence we believe that transition governments, following typical Western European practice of 
offering generous nonemployment benefits (see Blöndal and Scarpetta, 1997; Nickell, 2004), can 
be held partly responsible for aggregate output decline that took place in the early transition. 
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